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The "Big 3" Foundations and  
American Global Power 




Although large American foundations have not sold arms overseas, toppled 
foreign governments, or sought to govern other countries, their influence is felt around 
the world.  It is easy to imagine that foundations act entirely out of charitable impulses, 
designed to help people and nations to overcome poverty, illiteracy, and illness.  That is 
how many people think foundations operate, and that is how they want us to perceive 
them.  In fact, philanthropic foundations have shaped American political culture and 
assisted in imposing an American imperium upon the world, a hegemony constructed in 
significant part via cultural and intellectual penetration. 
 
Not all of the work of the "Big 3" foundations (Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie) 
was oriented toward foreign influence.  They also operated many domestic programs.  In 
a sense, the purpose was the same at home and abroad: to attain hegemony on behalf of 
elite interests by shaping the symbols of everyday life.  That aim was carried out by 
influencing publications, civic organizations, and, above all, higher education.  I will not 
attempt to deal with the domestic side of foundation programs except insofar as those 
activities were conducted to gain tacit support by Americans for active intervention in the 
affairs of other nations.by government, corporations, banks, and foundations.   Instead, I 
will focus on the role played by the major foundations in shaping a global consensus 
around modernization and the maintenance of institutions that perpetuate elitism and 
inequality.   
 
The Hegemonic Role of the Major Foundations 
 
In this article, I will show some of the ways in which the major foundations have been 
extremely influential in America’s rise to global hegemony over the past century.  The 
leadership of these foundations consisted of members of the eastern foreign policy 
establishment, which included the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy 
Association. From the 1920s onward, they sought to gain support of influential 
Americans for a globalist, anti-isolationist agenda and after World War II to construct a 
viable intellectual framework to promote the American perspective in world affairs. 
 
The development of foundation leadership in international relations took place in 
the three phases with different emphases, all of which were aimed at softening the 
sharper edges of globalization and elite dominance so they would remain acceptable to 
the public: 1) shifting American public opinion from the 1920s to the 1950s in favor of 
liberal internationalism and a strong national government, 2) creating an integrated global 
elite from the 1950s to the 1970s who could serve as conduits for American interests 
within the institutions of each nation, and 3) developing democratic reforms in response 
to neoliberalism after 1980 to gain legitimacy for the international order, in order to 
sustain the idea that the political and economic systems work for everyone.  In this 
fashion, foundations were able publicly to espouse principles of self-determination and 
economic development for every nation, even though their actions paved the way for the 
continuation of neo-colonialism.  Their policies were consistently hegemonic, in the 
sense that they sustained the widespread belief that global and national institutions that 
favor elites are both natural and inevitable.  Moreover, since elite factions are often at 
odds with each other, the foundations may be called upon to play the role of mediator and 
facilitator in developing an elite consensus that might otherwise become fragmented. 
 
Within the United States, foundations played a major role in rationalizing the 
political system by helping to ameliorate patronage, party bosses, and other practices that 
Progressives regarded as corrupt.  They also supported reform movements such as tem-
perance, social assistance for the poor, health and safety legislation, educational reform, 
and “Americanization” programs for immigrants.  In doing so, they denigrated localized 
centers of power and authority and created increasing legitimacy for the national 
government as the source of progressive change.  In this way, foundations were able to 
remain powerful arbiters of the kinds of regulations that would exist, preempting reform 
efforts that would place control in the hands of local bosses or state legislatures.  
 
The foundations were established when America’s federal executive institutions 
and “national” consciousness were weak and the individual states strong; the foundations 
spent hundreds of millions of dollars encouraging private parastate institutions to carry 
out functions such as urban renewal, improving schools, and promoting health and safety 
in workplaces, which were later subsumed and developed by the federal state, as well as 
to develop a supportive base in public opinion.  The foundations helped to “nationalize” 
American society. Today they are trying to achieve similar aims at the global level. 
Where the global system is institutionally relatively weak and nation-states jealously 
guard their sovereignty, the foundations are assisting in global institution building and in 
constructing a global “civil society” that sustains and develops such institutions, and this 
is also part of developing the infrastructure for continued American hegemony. 
 
By working to strengthen the federal government in the U.S., they were also 
strengthening the national economy and the power of the companies that had the capacity 
to sell in national markets.  The projects since 1980 to smooth over problems in the 
global economy have had the same effect: they have enhanced the power of banks and 
multinational corporations vis-a-vis smaller, local companies.  The larger the scale of 
business operations, the greater the concentration of power in the hands of elites. 
 
Control Scholarship, Control Culture 
 
Foundations facilitated the penetration of liberal American concepts of law, property, and 
social order throughout the world by cultivating networks of Western-educated elites in 
numerous countries. By funding academic work in area studies, political science, 
economics, and sociology, the big foundations created intellectual hubs radiating 
influence well beyond their immediate locales. Such networks were established in 
strategically important countries and regions—such as Indonesia, Chile, and Nigeria—
where a small group of scholars favoring Western-style modernization over nationalist 
development, could influence doctoral students in the region. They would, in turn, train 
thousands of other teachers.   
 
 After gaining independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the leaders of new nations in 
the developing world were eager to gain Western knowledge, in the belief that 
understanding the ideas and the technology of the former colonial power would enable 
them to gain a greater degree of economic and political independence.  In fact, the 
reverse was true.  Knowledge is never neutral.  To begin with, differential flows of 
knowledge give some groups power over others. Thus, access to Western knowledge 
became a new source of rivalry in many countries.  More importantly, Western-style 
learning also re-oriented the elites in developing countries toward the global centers of 
power and capital and away from their own national traditions. Castells (1994: 169-170) 
has argued that this process has caused the logic of indigenous leaders to become 
increasingly divorced from their local culture and preoccupations and more locked in to 
relative “placelessness." This is one of the important ways in which hegemonic power 
tends to uproot people and place them into what Castell calls the “hierarchical logic of 
the organization." 
 
The analysis by Pierre Bourdieu about the role of intellectuals in modern societies 
can also help us understand the process by which foundations have exercised hegemony 
through the seemingly innocuous medium of higher education.  Intellectuals have a 
relatively high status in modern society because of their ownership of cultural capital.  
Yet, cultural capital is subordinated to economic capital. They function as intermediaries 
between the economic capital of the foundation (and its sources of wealth) and the 
cultural capital that they create.  Intellectuals play that role by participating in large-scale 
bureaucratic organizations that favor technocratic expertise.  Through the work of those 
intellectuals, the philanthropic foundations strategically influence what is legitimate and 
illegitimate knowledge.  Using Bourdieu's framework, Swartz (1997: 101) explains that 
the power to establish new disciplines and shape methodology are not “simple 
contributions to the progress of science ... [they] are also always ‘political’ maneuvers 
that attempt to establish, restore, reinforce, protect, or reverse a determined structure of 
relations of symbolic domination."  
 
Brym (1980) offers an even simpler explanation of how foundation programs 
aimed at intellectuals were so often able to co-opt them and tip the scales in favor of elite 
interests: they offered employment opportunities.  An intellectual with a job (and perhaps 
a mortgage on a house) is far less likely to lead a revolution than one who has been 
thoroughly marginalized.  Thus, simply creating institutions that would absorb the labor 
of numerous intellectuals had the effect of channeling potential dissenting leaders into 
"safe" intellectual pursuits.   
 
It is never necessary for foundations to set explicit limits on research or to dictate 
conclusions to scholars who receive funding.  Such overt interference would be viewed as 
intolerable, and funding would be rejected.  But interference can and does occur routinely 
by a sort of via negativa, the denial of funding for research that questions in fundamental 
ways the justice of the current social order.   Scholars quickly learn what topics will not 
be funded.  As political scientist Harold Laski (1930: 163, 174) explained:   
‘Dangerous’ problems are not likely to be investigated, especially not by 
‘dangerous’ men.’"... The  foundations do not control simply because, in the direct 
and simple sense of the word, there is no need for them to do so. They have only to 
indicate the immediate direction of their minds for the whole university world to 
discover that it always meant to gravitate swiftly to that angle of the intellectual 
compass. 
 
Laski thus explain how it is possible for foundations to give money to 
intellectuals without apparent strings and yet maintain control.  Even a whiff of the overt 
use of power would generate resistance.  Hegemonic control would fail automatically in 
the face of resistance.  It works entirely through socialization and tacit indoctrination.  
Thus, foundations fund institutions that will gently guide intellectuals along predictable 
paths, much as graduate education does in the U.S. or Europe.  Under those conditions, 
no one tells a graduate student or post-doctoral fellow what to study, but plenty of advice 
is offered against pursuing some topics that are understood to be off limits.  Thus, the 
process of sustaining hegemony begins at home on the domestic population and is then 
exported, via foundation grants, to universities, think tanks, and other knowledge-
generating institutions around the world.   
 
For American foundations, the construction of global knowledge networks is 
almost an end in itself. Indeed, the network appears to be their principal long-term 
achievement. Although foundation-sponsored networks also attempt to operate as means 
of achieving particular ends, generally speaking, those ends are not necessarily the ones 
publicly stated. However, despite their oft-stated aims of eradicating poverty, uplifting 
the poor, improving living standards, aiding economic development, and so on, even the 
U.S. foundations’ own assessments of their impact show that they largely have failed in 
these efforts. On the other hand, those very reports lay claim to great success in building 
strong global knowledge networks that sustain foundation investments, such as their 
funded research fellows, research programs, and lines of communication across 
universities, think tanks, makers of foreign policy, and foreign academics. 
 
Are Foundations Elitist? 
 
Fundamental to my argument here is the premise that the major foundations act in ways 
that sustain a stable social order that will not challenge the power of elites.  The 
hypothesis of elite hegemonic control challenges the dominant pluralist view in the social 
sciences.  According to pluralists, there is no power elite, a "market-place of ideas" 
determines what theories gain support among scholars, society is divided into interest 
groups that vie with each other for recognition and power, and social class or relative 
wealth plays little role in determining the outcome of political or intellectual contests.  In 
short, pluralism presupposes a meritocracy in which ideas and policies win on the basis 
of interest-group coalitions.   This is very much a bottom-up view of decision-making, in 
contrast to the top-down view that I am proposing.   
 
  
Of course, there are many elements of modern societies that conform to the 
pluralist vision of even-handed competition among numerous factions and interest 
groups.  There are many social and economic issues, particularly those that arise at the 
state and local level, that are of little or no interest to elites.  As a result, it is possible for 
the advocates of pluralism to find hundreds or thousands of examples that fit the model.  
What the model cannot explain, however, is how certain ideas that serve as the pillars of 
capitalist ideology attain dominance and how the pervasiveness of those ideas sets limits 
on the types of research, education, and journalism that are permissible.  The pluralist 
model is also unable to explain how scholars engage in self-censorship in choosing both 
topics and methods of analysis.  In short, the pluralist ideology blinds a large segment of 
the intelligentsia to the ways in which elites set the parameters of debate and engineer the 
"consent of the governed" (Parmar 2000).   
 
The model I use in analyzing the behavior of foundations is neo-Gramscian.  The 
concept of "hegemony" was developed by Antonio Gramsci in the 1920s and 1930s.  It 
combines an understanding of elites acting to protect their interests with a detailed 
description of their methods of gaining legitimacy through the manipulation of ideas and 
information.  If elites were required openly to exercise power to achieve their goals, such 
as by spending large amounts on election campaigns for "pro-business" candidates, their 
effectiveness in a democracy would be limited and the legitimacy of their efforts would 
be questioned.  However, the hegemonic approach to power involves working behind the 
scenes, through institutions such as foundations and universities, to shape the climate of 
opinion in ways that are virtually invisible.  Whereas there are numerous critics of the 
open use of power, few dig deep enough to recognize the hegemonic forms of power that 
are exercised by foundations. 
 
The elitism of foundations is not merely a function of methods.  Although the 
major foundations hire staff from a wide range of backgrounds, the members of the board 
come from a common social background—the east coast Establishment.  Since the power 
of a foundation lies with its board, not its staff, the composition of the board reveals a 
high degree of consistency in its elitism. Elsewhere (Parmar 2012: ch. 2), I have provided 
dozens of examples showing that the boards of the Big 3 foundations have been drawn 
from the upper echelons of society: people from wealthy backgrounds, who graduated 
from Ivy League universities, worked for the most prestigious law firms in New York 
and Washington, D.C., or were executives or directors of large corporations, U.S. State 
Department officials, senior members of other foreign service agencies, publishers, 
ambassadors, or trustees of other elite nonprofits. Nielsen (1972:316) described the 
composition of the Big 3 as “a microcosm of... the Establishment, the power elite, or the 
American ruling class.”  There can be little doubt, then, that the boards of major 
foundations have been drawn from the upper class. 
 
The leadership of the major foundations has long shared a common bond in 
wanting to achieve pre-eminence for the United States, to establish liberal 
internationalism as a unifying global ideology, and to maintain a capitalistic economic 
order softened by enough social welfare programs to sustain its legitimacy.  Because the 
outlines of this program are very broad, it has not required great effort to coordinate 
efforts or to police the boundaries of this tacit consensus.   In answer to (Inboden 2012), 
who refers to my method of analysis as "conspiracy philanthropy," I make no claim that 
the heads of the major foundations meet to adopt a common strategy, an action implied 
by the term "conspiracy."1  Instead, similar upbringing in elite schools, shared 
experiences in business and law, and overlapping economic interests are enough to create 
the broad outlines of a common worldview among a large segment of the elite.  There 
are, of course, conservative foundations that are outspoken in promoting a free-market 
ideology, so there might seem to be conflict among elites.  If so, that would challenge the 
theory of hegemony and favor pluralism.  In fact, the difference is one of style, not 
substance, a bit like the stereotype of "good cop, bad cop."  The conservative foundations 
may oppose the softened version of corporate power that they perceive the liberal 
foundations to be advocating, but that is only because they have yet to learn that the 
aristocrat who covers the iron fist with a velvet glove is often more effective than one 
who makes an open show of power. 
 
Case Studies of Foundation Programs 
 
Indonesia: Prerequisites for a Coup D'etat  
 
In the 1950s, as the Cold War intensified, the foreign policy establishment in the United 
States was eager to gain influence among the elites of the emerging nations.  In Asia, one 
of the most important nations was Indonesia, in part because of its petroleum reserves, 
but also because President Sukarno was a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement.  In 
addition, the Communist Party had a larger membership in Indonesia than in any other 
country, other than the Soviet Union and China. In short, independent Indonesia could 
not be counted on to cooperate with the United States and to give priority to American 
interests.   
 
Starting in 1951, the Ford Foundation entered the fray quietly by financing 
programs in several related areas: 1) "area studies" programs at elite universities (Cornell, 
Berkeley, MIT, Harvard) to build the capacity for scholars to better understand the 
languages and culture of the targeted country (Indonesia), 2) programs in Indonesia for 
elite scholars in that nation to gain a greater appreciation for Western political theories 
and social science methods, 3) seminars, colloquia, and other projects to bring American 
and Indonesian scholars together, nominally for the purpose of promoting economic 
development.    
 
As Dyke Brown, a Ford official, explained in an internal memorandum, the aim of 
the foundation should be "to mobilize Western resources of knowledge with respect to 
Asia." This needed to be done quickly because of the urgency of responding to "Asia's 
revolutionary convulsions."  Diffuse knowledge, scattered among dozens of scholars 
throughout the United States, had little or no value.  Thus, the foundation needed to 
create programs that concentrated knowledge of critical countries in the region within a 
few university departments so that it could be put to use in the service of U.S. 
government operations.  Thus the logic of "mobilizing" knowledge was to penetrate 
Indonesian society (and other Asian societies).   
 
Considerable evidence from the Ford Foundation archives reveals that its true 
motives were to be kept hidden.  For example, as Brown (1951) shows, when Ford 
commissioned scholars at Stanford University to carry out a survey of existing Asian 
studies programs in U.S. universities, Ford wanted it to appear that the initiative had 
come from Stanford.  This is the sort of fiction under which most grants are made.  In 
theory, potential grantees approach the foundation with an idea, and the foundation 
determines if it is suitable.  In practice, many programs operated by major foundations 
are initiated by the foundation, which leaves control firmly in the hands of the 
foundation.  However, in this case, the motive was more sinister than the usual charade of 
being a disinterested party.  Since the Ford Foundation was working so closely with the 
American government in shaping foreign policy in Asia, Ford staff wanted to keep a low 
profile.   
 
Another seemingly innocuous program funded by the Ford Foundation was the 
Modern Indonesia Project (MIP) at Cornell University, managed by Prof. George Kahin, 
director of Cornell's Southeast Asia program.  On its face, MIP produced 45 books and 
articles about various facets of Indonesian society, including the Chinese minority, the 
background of political and military elites, and village field studies. Since the Indonesian 
government frowned upon foreign scholars carrying out studies, most of the work was 
done by indigenous scholars, which served the purpose of quickly increasing the number 
of Western-trained social scientists who were skeptical of the Sukarno regime.   
 
Although the MIP seemed initially to be a politically neutral undertaking, Kahin 
was surprised when he discovered a layer of secrecy and subterfuge that contradict 
normal standards of academic transparency and integrity. For example, Kahin (1954) was 
disturbed that Cleon Swayzee of Ford had made it clear "not to identify the Indonesia 
Study as a Ford Foundation project."  He also realized that the unstated aim of many 
studies was to evaluate the strength and influence of the Communist Party in Indonesia. 
Since the MIP was effectively an intelligence-gathering operation about the Communists 
in Indonesia, the project was really a privately-funded program on behalf of the U.S. 
State Department and CIA, each of which endorsed Ford's plans in the early stages 
(Swayzee 1953; Langer 1953). The implications of this are staggering.  If the leaders of 
any nation had learned that the Ford Foundation was coordinating its activities with the 
State Department and CIA, the foundation's credibility would have been destroyed.  Even 
many American scholars would have been reluctant to accept grants from Ford, if its 
grants were publicly known to be tied, directly or indirectly, to American efforts to 
destabilize and overthrow a foreign government, which the CIA sought to do in Indonesia 
in 1958.   
 
The program with Cornell University was only one part of the Ford Foundation's 
strategic plan for Indonesia. In order to create a network of scholars in Asian studies, 
Ford spent hundreds of thousands of dollars for an Association for Asian Studies (AAS) 
that held annual conferences and  gave those scholars a forum to meet each other and 
government officials.  By 1965, the AAS had three thousand members, a quarterly 
newsletter, and a prestigious review, the Journal of Asian Studies.  This network formed 
the backbone of many other Ford programs in Asia.   
 
Another Ford program in Indonesia consisted of funding economists and other 
social scientists who were critical of the Left-wing Sukarno government and who would 
be prepared to manage a post-Sukarno Indonesian government.  To do this, Ford created 
a program at the University of California, Berkeley that was designed to train Indonesian 
social scientists.  Ransom (1970) broke this story in a left-wing periodical, citing an 
interview with John Howard, a Ford Foundation official, who had told him that "Ford felt 
it was training the guys who would be leading the country when Sukharno got out."  Ford 
staff prepared a dossier of disclaimers to refute Ransom's story, but the press generally 
ignored the whole episode, so the dossier was never needed.2 Among the rejoinders 
developed by foundation staff, John Howard claims that he was misquoted and that he 
merely said the economists trained by Ford later became government officials.  
 
The evidence from internal foundation documents contradicts the facade 
maintained by the Ford Foundation.  Pehaps most telling was the resignation of Leonard 
A. Doyle,  the first professor who headed up the University of California, Berkeley, 
program in Jakarta from 1956 to 1958.  The nominal purpose of the program he headed, 
financed entirely by the Ford Foundation, was to rationalize the teaching of economics at 
the University of Indonesia, which effectively meant transforming it from a European 
style of indendent graduate study to an American style of directed education or guided 
study.  The economists trained in the program were influential not only within the 
university, but in other universities as well, in the same way that elite university faculty 
have a national influence in other countries.  Why, then, would Prof. Doyle, a staid 
business professor, want to resign from a successful program? Doyle recognized the 
political intent of the entire program and left because he did not want Berkeley to get 
"involved in what essentially was becoming a rebellion against the government—
whatever sympathy you might have with the rebel cause and the rebel objectives"  
(Ransom 1970: 41).  Michael Harris (1958), the Ford representative in Jakarta, was 
disturbed that Doyle openly, in 1958, expressed disquiet about the program and had 
called on the University of California to discontinue its involvement. Doyle believed that 
the university had been an unwitting tool of the State Department in pursuit of unsound 
policies.  Thus, Doyle's disaffection was no secret to Ford staff.  Rather, it was an 
embarrassment, never mentioned in Ford's public statements about the program.  The 
reticence of Ford to publicize the disgruntlement of an internal critic is understandable.  
However, this episode clearly reveals that Ford was engaged in political maneuvering in 
Indonesia, contrary to its public claims of neutrality.3 
 
When a successful coup was staged in 1965 by the Indonesian army, rationalizing 
it as a response to false rumors of a planned communist coup, the pre-conditions for its 
success had largely been put in place by Ford Foundation programs.  There is no 
evidence that the coup was planned in New York or Washington.  That was not 
necessary.  Rather, a network of Westernized elites had received training through Ford 
grants to the University of Indonesia, and those elites were closely allied with the upper 
echelons of the Indonesian army (Scott 1985: 247-249). In addition, the research that had 
been done under Ford auspices regarding the village-level activities of Communist Party 
of Indonesia (PKI), along with CIA-supplied lists of Party members, made it possible for 
the army to identify and execute their opponents quickly.   
 
In a letter that eventually reached McGeorge Bundy, the new president of the 
Ford Foundation, Francis Miller (1966), a Ford staff member in Indonesia, rejoiced over 
the victory of the army and the New Order in Indonesia: "There is a holiday spirit and 
exhilaration over the change; and a virtual worship of the young people who have been 
forcing all elements against the Sukarno clique and regime."  He also stated that he was 
"struck...[by] the virtual hilarity over the liquidation of several hundred thousand fellow-
countrymen."  He adds that the Ford Foundation can now do business in Indonesia again.  
If the foundation had been the purveyor of neutral social science methods to the 
University of Indonesia economics department, its officers would have been appalled to 
discover that the students it had trained at the University of Indonesia were among the 
leaders in the anti-communist massacres that took between 400,000 and 1,000,000 lives 
following the army's successful coup. There is no hint of regret or remorse in any 
documents in the foundation's archives.   There was no investigation into what went 
wrong, precisely because the outcome was the one desired by the State Department and 
the Ford Foundation. Instead of immediately withdrawing support in the face of such a 
grotesque massacre of hundreds of thousands of unarmed civilians, the Ford Foundation 
redoubled its efforts in Indonesia by giving $2 million to Harvard's Development 
Advisory Service to assist the National Development Planning Agency, chaired by the 
Ford-funded economist, Widjojo Nitisastro.   
 
If Ford's aim in Indonesia had truly been to achieve economic development, the 
program was a miserable failure, by its own standards.  Under the New Order after the 
coup, large-scale foreign investment was permitted, with concessions offered.  Various 
modernization programs were begun.  Smith (1978) reported that few jobs had been 
created, that the army was involved in "illegal tax collection, smuggling, and commercial 
activities," and the Ford-trained economists and technocrats were poor state managers.  
Since Ford's ostensible rationale for developing a strong economics faculty at the 
University of Indonesia had been to promote economic development, the inability of 
those economists to do so might have been cause for alarm.  But now that a friendly, pro-
Western government was in place, Ford seems to have developed a business-as-usual 
attitude with a high tolerance for failure.   
 
Nigeria and Civil War 
 
All three of the major foundations with broad international interests—Carnegie, Ford, 
and Rockefeller—were involved in programs to develop a better understanding of 
African society and politics and to promote economic development in that continent.  
Since their intentions seemed purely philanthropic, they were welcomed by national 
governments.   
 
Carnegie's real purpose was to protect the interests of whites in Africa, a 
continuation of policies based on a belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority, a belief that 
reflected Andrew Carnegie's own attitudes.  Thus, when the Carnegie Corporation took 
the lead in founding the African Studies Association (ASA) in 1957, it is not surprising 
that the ASA was constituted as an elite, top-down, white-led organization that sought to 
impose its vision of Western-style development on Africans.  For Carnegie, as for the 
State Department, the primary reason for actively pursuing any sort of relationship with 
African colonies and nations was to develop the necessary political ties to secure strategic 
minerals for the future.   In the 1950s, Africa was considered by most foundation staff to 
be little more than a reservoir of natural resources.  In short, foundations, government 
officials, and corporations had a common outlook on Africa. 
 
A racialist and colonialist view of the world informed the programs developed by 
Ford and Rockefeller as well.  When they entered the field of African studies, they 
simply ignored the long history of research in that field at historically black colleges and 
decided to create entirely new programs at elite, predominantly white universities that 
had no prior experience with the study of Africa.  The reason was simple: they trusted 
white scholars from an elite social background not to be too heavily influenced by pan-
Africanism or who linked the plight of Africa to the treatment of African-Americans.  As 
Gershenhorn (2009) has argued, foundations would not fund any scholars who questioned 
continued European dominance in Africa or the State Department's Cold War stance.  
The programs at Howard University, for example, were funded by Ford only after they 
were deemed suitable for  inculcating an appropriate understanding of Africa to African-
American or African students "who sometimes approach the field with a strong emotional 
or political bias"  (Ford Executive Committee 1957).  The clear implication was that the 
colonial or American perspective on Africa was objective, whereas the perspective of 
Africans was tainted by emotion or politics. 
 
Once again, we see that hegemonic control operates mostly by what does not take 
place.  Evidence of absence is harder to accumulate than evidence of presence, so the 
case for hegemony is always difficult to prove.  In this case, however, the bypassing of 
African-American scholars who were deemed politically unreliable, despite their 
expertise, is a pretty clear sign that the foundation programs were governed by a political 
agenda that was never publicly stated. 
 
When the U.S. Army wanted to commission research on Nigeria as part of 
"Project Camelot," it turned to the African Studies Association for politically reliable 
scholars who might investigate the sources of potential conflict in African nations from 
an "objective" (Eurocentric) perspective.  Since scholars were reluctant to be visibly 
associated with the U.S. military and intelligence agencies, funding was channeled 
through the National Academy of Sciences and several foundations, including Carnegie 
and Ford.  After "Project Camelot" was exposed as an intelligence-gathering program in 
1965 (Lowe 1965), Carnegie refused to serve as a conduit for U.S. Army funds to the 
ASA members conducting oral history interviews on nationalist movements.  Scholars 
became fearful of being identified with the CIA.  Ford, nevertheless, continued funding 
the Oral Data Collection project of the ASA.   
 
The elitist African Studies Association might reasonably be viewed as the alter-
ego of the foundations in African research.  By 1968, that elitism had become the source 
of overt contention especially among African-American scholars of Africa. That year, a 
black caucus of ASA members, supported by numerous white members, demanded 
greater black participation in ASA affairs.  By 1969, discontent bubbled over into a mass 
walk-out at the ASA convention in Montreal and the formation of the African Heritage 
Studies Association (AHSA).  This split between the elitist and the participatory scholars, 
and between the white oligarchy and radical scholars provided the foundations with a 
perfect opportunity to demonstrate how even-handed they are.  If the foundations were 
truly neutral, non-political institutions concerned only to further the development of 
greater understanding, in this case of Africa, they would have funded the AHA and the 
AHSA evenly, or in accordance with the size of their membership.  Pearl T. Robinson 
(1974: 8), a program officer at Ford, believed that Ford was partly to blame for "its lack 
of sensitivity to issues which ultimately proved to be critical."  Yet, Ford continued to 
show a "lack of sensitivity."  It provided the AHSA with a one-time grant of $10,000 to 
cover transportation costs for overseas speakers at its 1970 annual conference.  By 
contrast, Ford gave a total of at least $300,000 to the ASA in 1970, 1974, and 1975.  This 
decision clearly demonstrates Ford's political intentions in Africa as hegemonic—aimed 
at recruiting elites, not democratic.   
 
When Ford set up a fellowship program in 1969 exclusively for black Africanists, 
the results were again highly skewed.  After ten years, almost 80% of the fellowships had 
been awarded to black students from historically-white elite universities, and only two 
from historic black colleges received an award.  The net effect was that there was an 
increase in the cadre of black Africanists who formed a network attached to elite white 
universities, government agencies, and "mainstream" organizations.   
 
Educational programs in Nigeria were developed in the context of this 
foundation-induced racial tension among American scholars and African scholars 
studying in the United States.  The Carnegie Corporation was almost entirely 
unselfconscious of its imperialist orientation, simply assuming, as late as the 1960s, that 
philanthropy in Africa was the "white man's burden."  Thus, Carnegie planned a Western-
style of higher education for Nigeria without consulting any Nigerians.  The major 
foundations took the same approach when they collaborated in making the University of 
Ibadan the dominant university in Nigeria and a center of Western-oriented education.   
 
The main purpose of higher education, in the eyes of foundation program officers, 
was to train the personnel by which Nigeria would develop in accordance with Western 
plans involving modernization and high levels of foreign investment.  This was all carried 
out on the premise that Americans and the elites who concurred with them knew better 
than the majority of Nigerians what was in their best interests.  As Aboyade (2003: 302) 
explained, the result was a disaster for Nigeria: the Anglocentrism and neocolonial 
mindset of the ruling elite was responsible for "the traumatic civil war, the total lack of 
commitment, dedication, and patriotism on the part of the general populace, the false 
sense of values, and the almost total neglect of a search for authentic Nigerian 
scholarship."  When civil war came in 1967, the rivalry over position and foundation 
funding among the University of Ibadan faculty was one of the factors that heightened the 
conflict among ethnic groups.  Many Ibadan academics were directly involved in the 
secessionist movement that led to war (Oloruntimehin 1973: 100).  The decision by Ford and 
Carnegie to make Ibadan the premier university in Nigeria was a catalyst for conflict 
because it contradicted the federal government's aim of balancing regional power centers.  
 
 As in Indonesia, the big foundations meddled in domestic politics by 
favoring elite education that produced a network of Western-oriented economists and 
social scientists.  The result was again a retreat from nationalistic policies designed to 
encourage indigenous plans for development.  The foundations failed both in the U.S. and 
in Nigeria to take into account the diverse interests and sensitivities of the scholars they 
were working with.  At home, their elite network splintered, but they were able to 
construct a secondary network of black scholars as well.  In Nigeria, foundation 
programs, particularly at the Univerity of Ibadan, upset a delicate balance of power 
among ethnic groups, exacerbated rivalries, and eventually catalyzed a civil war.  The 
aim of hegemonic control was essentially the same as in Indonesia, but in Nigeria, the 
government did not stand in the way.  Instead, the foundations stumbled over their own 
feet by inadvertently taking sides in a regional dispute.  In the long run, the foundations 
succeeded in developing the elite networks that are the backbone of hegemony.  But, in 
the short run, they took many missteps that cost lives. 
 
Chile and the Illusion of Pluralism 
 
 Chile was the launching site for a full-scale effort by the Big 3 foundations 
to reverse the long-standing affiliation of intellectuals with left-wing ideologies.  The 
stakes here were much higher than in any other part of the world because the prize was 
much bigger: not merely Chile, but all of Latin America.  Because of the long-standing 
democratic traditions in Chile, it was expected to be the model for non-Marxist reform 
throughout the continent.  More foundation money was invested in Chile, per capita, than 
in any other country outside the United States (Bell 1973: 4). 
 
 Since the rationale for overthrowing the regime of Salvador Allende in 
1978 was that he was Marxist, one might imagine that the primary focus of foundation 
programs in Chile after the coup would have been to root out all vestiges of Marxism in 
higher education.  That is precisely what the regime of the new Chilean dictator, General 
Pinochet, did.  Thousands of intellectuals, including university professors, were fired or 
even imprisoned and tortured.  That sort of brutality turned the majority of Chileans 
against the regime, so that democracy was eventually restored in 1992.   
 
By avoiding a direct connection with the extremes of the Pinochet regime, the 
major foundations were able to maintain credibility throughout the era and achieve their 
hegemonic purposes in spite of the bloodshed, not because of it.  From the beginning in 
the 1960s, the foundations set their sights on long-term goals by creating an image of 
being balanced and neutral.  In fact, the foundations sought to penetrate Latin America 
with an ideology that appeared to be non-ideological.   Any group that can implant an 
ideology that comes to seem natural and not open to question has effectively gained total 
hegemonic control.  That is what the foundations hoped to achieve, and, to some extent, 
they came close to reaching that goal. 
 
The primary mechanism by which the foundations achieved their hegemonic aims 
was by funding scholars and programs that promoted more than one perspective on 
economic policy in the 1960s.  Thus, at various stages, the Ford and Rockefeller 
Foundations supported the free-market ideology of the economics faculty of the 
University of Chicago, and they also provided funding for the economists who favored 
the autarkic nationalism of "dependency theory," which was developed by Raul Prebisch 
and ECLA (the United Nations Commission for Latin America).    However, there was a 
limit to the "balanced" approach to funding.  The state technical university, which had 
twice as many students as the heavily funded Catholic University, received no support 
because it was a known center of Marxist thought (Bell 1970: 6).  Thus, the pluralism that 
was the goal of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations was constrained pluralism, always 
limited to ideas that fell with the range of acceptability to elites.  The implicit assumption 
behind their grants was that all researchers would agree with two premises: 1) that 
economics is a neutral, technocratic science, and 2) that an economy represents a natural 
harmony of interests, without any inherent conflict of classes.   
 
As one simple indication of how fully self-deceived foundation staff and their 
grantees were about ideology, we can point to a specific event that epitomizes the 
problem. In a conversation with the staff of the Rockefeller Foundation, Ted Schulz, dean 
of the department of economics at the University of Chicago, denied any desire to "sell" 
an ideology through his department's programs in Latin America.  However, in the same 
conversation he emphasized that the problem on that continent was the "indiscriminate 
intervention of governments [in the economy] ... and their tendency to rank the 
inflationary problem below that of economic growth." (Yudelman 1956). This was a view 
that Schulze presumably considered non-ideological, and the foundation staff was 
apparently also unaware of the irony. 
 
Thus, when Ford and Rockefeller professed to support economic education in 
Chile (and throughout Latin America) on a non-ideological basis,  they sincerely believed 
they were doing so.  In their minds, the ideological spectrum ranged from the free-market 
economists of Chicago on the right to the dependistas of ECLA on the left.  Since the 
foundations supported economists across the spectrum, they viewed their actions as 
pluralistic, not oriented toward any particular ideology.   Since Marxists questioned not 
only the biased results of exchange in market economies, but also the methodologies that 
left private ownership and capital accumulation as "givens, outside the framework of 
analysis, the foundations regarded them as "ideological."   
 
After the coup in 1973, professors with Marxist leanings were fired from their 
universities, and students were dismissed; some were arrested, tortured, and killed.  In the 
ensuing years, the different "factions" of economists (centrists and dependistas) worked 
together more closely than before, since they were bound together by a common 
antipathy to fascism but adopted common technocratic ‘non-political’ economics 
methodologies.  This revealed just how narrow the spectrum of acceptable ideology had 
always been.  Nevertheless, unlike the tacit support from foundation staff for the coup in 
Indonesia in 1965, the coup in Chile disturbed the Ford staff, and much of its program 
spending from 1973 to 1978 was designed to provide an institutional base of support for 
social scientists who did not fit within the narrow Pinochet mold.  
 
 During the period of soul searching that followed the coup, some Ford Program 
Officers in Santiago, particularly Nita Manitzas (1973a) and Kalman Silvert (1974), 
recognizing that the economic models being promulgated in Latin America were failures, 
proposed radical revisioning of development in terms of indigenous culture and 
perceptions, a far cry from the technocratic model of development Ford had adopted.4  
But, ultimately this brief period of raising questions inside Ford did not have a lasting 
effect on its centrist, technocratic ideology.  Nor did any foundation acknowledge 
responsibility for having trained the establishment-oriented economists who readily 
assumed positions of power in the autocratic Pinochet regime. As Manitzas (1973b) 
summarized the situation succinctly: “Our agricultural economists are sitting in the Junta 
and the sociologists are getting wiped out in the stadium.” 
 
In the end, the foundations achieved their aim.  When the military regime was 
removed from power in 1989 by a plebiscite, the neutral, centrist, "apolitical" economists 
who had been trained with foundation support became the leading economists in the 
democratically-elected government.  The foundations had managed to re-engineer and 
sustain their networks and to shape the politics of Latin America in the following 
decades.  As a result, when a wave of "left-wing" reformers took office in Brazil, Peru, 
Venezuela, Bolivia, and Chile around 2005, the American-trained economists they relied 
on to implement reforms were sufficiently moderate that no reform was more radical than 
the New Deal that was adopted in the United States in the 1930s.   
 
After the Cold War: Democratizing the World 
 
When the Cold War ended, the Big 3 foundations had to find a new rationale for 
American foreign policy that was no longer based on "containment" of Soviet power.  
Under the new conditions that emerged in the 1990s, the foundations promoted concepts 
that justified American hegemony in the guise of helping other nations achieve 
democracy.  The ultimate aim of the American foreign policy establishment, of which the 
major foundations remain an element, was to create a uni-polar international system of 
globalized commerce that supported the interests of elites without seeming to do so.  
American leaders want to be able to defend the notion that the world is comprised of 
sovereign states and that the U.S. has no special privileges.  The foundations continue to 
play the role of providing legitimacy for this U.S.-centered system. 
 
A central concept fostered in the early 1990s was "democratic peace theory" 
(DPT).  According to DPT, democracies are peaceful and non-democratic states are 
unstable and liable to back terrorist groups; as a result, the way to maintain a stable 
global order is by promoting democracy.  This idea did not emerge as an academic 
exercise.  Rather, it was nurtured initially by a grant from the  Ford Foundation (and later 
the MacArthur Foundation) for articles by Michael Doyle (1983a; 1983b) developing 
"liberal peace theory," which emphasizes the importance of global free trade in sustaining 
peace among nations.   In the hands of academics, these ideas are primarily concepts to 
be debated.  In the hands of government officials, the same ideas were used as doctrines 
to justify efforts to impose democracy on other nations in a form that suited American 
interests.   
 
Larry Diamond, a liberal hawk, was a key figure in the migration of DPT from 
academia to policy making. As co-editor after 1990 of the Journal of Democracy, 
published by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Diamond was well-
established in interventionist circles of the foreign policy establishment. He was also 
closely associated with the Clinton-aligned Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) of the 
Democratic Party, and contributed an important study on democracy promotion to a 
Carnegie Commission in 1995.  Diamond later served the Bush administration in Iraq as 
a senior adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority.  In a report to PPI, Diamond 
(1991) urged the United States to "reshape" national sovereignty to permit American 
engagement abroad to democratize other nations.  Here we can see the beginnings of a 
public rationale for unilateral American intervention in the affairs of other nations, all in 
the name of democracy.  This was in sharp contrast to older doctrines that emphasized 
global order and the sovereignty of nations.   
 
If ever there was a clear and present danger to the United States, when there was a 
need for the influential major foundations to serve as a counterweight to fashionable 
political thought, this was such a period.  If foundations were truly neutral, progressive, 
and oriented toward the public interest, as they profess to be, they would have made 
every effort to create a slow, deliberative process around the development of a new 
foreign policy framework, particularly after radical ideas about American unilateral 
intervention began to surface.  Yet, anyone who sincerely expected foundations to play 
that role was hopelessly naive.  In fact, foundations supported the work in question, just 
as they have always supported work that protects the international mobility of capital and 
an auspicious investment climate around the world.  Thus, when Diamond (1995: 47) 
published a report for Carnegie’s Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, it was not 
a surprise that he should argue that “the precarious balance of political and social forces 
in many newly democratic and transitional countries” provided “international actors ... 
real scope to influence the course of political development.”   Thus, the policy of placing 
the United States at the pinnacle of global power, as the teacher and judge of democracy 
in other nations, did not occur despite the warnings of foundations, but precisely because 
foundations provided the patronage necessary to develop those ideas and give them 
credibility. 
 
The only serious debate about democratic peace theory among members of the 
foreign policy establishment in the past two decades was over the question of timing.  
The issue in contention was this: can democracy be imposed from outside using a 
standard template, or does it require the development of internal institutions supportive of 
democracy to evolve in a culturally-specific context?  This debate occurred in the 1990s 
in the pages of the Harvard-based journal International Security, which receives support, 
directly and indirectly from both the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment.  The 
Clinton and Obama Administrations adopted the nuanced approach presented by 
Mansfield and Snyder (1995), who advocated the application of stabilizing measures and 
internal coalition formation before expecting nations to adopt democratic elections.  The 
George W. Bush Administration, by contrast, adopted the Larry Diamond method of 
transplanting “democracy” wholesale, without regard to "societal pre-conditions."  
 
To the average citizen, the problematic character of “assisting” other nations to 
achieve democracy may not be readily apparent.  Since democracy is supposed to be the 
most desirable form of government, who could possibly object if the United States uses 
its military and economic power to create or sustain democracies in other countries?  
From this perspective, it would be absurd to criticize foundations for initiating these 
ideas. Would it not be true that the citizens of the democratized country would 
necessarily benefit?  The answer is “no.”  A democracy imposed from outside can never 
truly be “rule of the people.”  It is likely to remain a hollow shell, form without content.   
 
To understand why democracy cannot be imposed or even supported by outside 
parties, we need only consider the following thought experiment.  How would the 
citizens of the United States have felt if a delegation from Uganda, Sierra Leone, 
Thailand, Bolivia, Haiti, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, and Poland had descended on the U.S. in 
November 2000 to resolve the obvious problems with the American electoral system?  
Since there was suspected malfeasance by state and county officials in Florida, and since 
the Supreme Court made a purely political decision to assign Florida’s delegates in the 
electoral college to George W. Bush, an international delegation could easily have 
reached the conclusion that corruption in American elections was rampant and that the 
situation threatened the security of true democracies.  Few Americans would probably 
favor this intervention, even those who agree that the electoral system is rife with abuse. 
Americans would say, “It may be a bad system, but it is our bad system.”  The fact that 
everyone in the world is affected by elections in the United States would likely fall on 





I have endeavored to show here that the “Big 3” foundations (Ford, Rockefeller, 
Carnegie) have been deeply immersed in the formation and implementation of American 
foreign policy for many decades, since the period before World War II.  The three case 
studies reveal precisely how the liberal hegemonic power of foundations has been exerted 
on three continents: Asia, Africa, and South America.  In every case, the objective has 
been the same: the creation of networks of scholars in the social sciences, particularly in 
economics, who will provide advice to governments that conforms to the general outlines 
of the ideology of the foundations.   
 
Despite their protestations to the contrary, the major foundations have rarely been 
neutral or nonpartisan in their funding patterns.  They have effectively guided debate both 
in the U.S. and abroad by cultivating networks of scholars who share the point of view 
the foundations wish to develop and preserve: reformist and humanitarian, but always 
within the bounds of a globalizing legal and political system that protects investments, 
permits vast accumulations of wealth, and denies the legitimacy of perspectives that 
question the present economic order.   
 The foundations achieve their goals quietly and unobtrusively by investing in 
scholars who are already sympathetic to their aims.  It is never necessary for foundations 
to twist arms or compel allegiance.  Word of mouth among scholars makes it clear that 
those who are willing to orient their work in the way foundations approve will have a 
chance to win large grants, travel the world, attend prestigious conferences, and play an 
influential role in the development of foreign policy.   
 
This process of co-opting promising young scholars with money and opportunities 
is how hegemony operates.  For the projects of various foundations to achieve a common 
purpose of sustaining an ideology that broadly reflects the status quo does not require any 
sort of conscious effort.   If the maintenance of hegemony required foundations to meet 
together to formulate a very specific plan of action, it would fail quickly.  That sort of 
coordination is impossible to maintain for any length of time.  But if the objective is 
much simpler—to deny oxygen to your ideological opponents—that can be done easily.  
No complicated conspiracy is necessary.  All that is required is a common understanding 
among elites and their co-opted followers that social science models will reflect a 
pluralist perspective and insist on the premise that society is a balance of interests in 
harmony and equilibrium.  All that is forbidden is more than occasional support for 
research or action that contradicts that point of view, research that supports the view that 
concentrations of wealth and power in a capitalist system distort social relationships, the 
legal system, and opportunities for individual fulfillment 
 
No one has summarized the overall bias in the aims of the major foundations as 
clearly as John Farrell (1973: 6), a Ford Foundation program officer:  
The Foundation has a structure and interests, symbolized by the 
people it picks for trustees and officers, that suggest there would, in the long 
run at least, be limits on our freedom to opt for overly leftist values and 
objectives, to support scholarship that would show how power and wealth is 
controlled in a given society, or what social patterns are perpetuated by, for 
example, the operations of a multinational corporation or the foreign 
assistance programs of the Agency for International Development. 
That statement applies equally well to Rockefeller, Carnegie, and most other large 
foundations.  As Farrell says, they set limits.  Those limits are always tacit, unspoken.  
The foundations define the limits by deciding which research to fund.   They need never 
overtly reveal their intentions by stating they will not fund research that is openly critical 
of the power elite or that accurately explains the role of foundations.  Their hegemonic 
power allows that information to become common knowledge without ever making it 
explicit.  Few institutions have that sort of ability to influence public opinion.    
 
Foundation program officers may differ from the elitist ideology of their 
employers from time to time, but they quickly learn discretion in sharing their private 
views.  The institutional message seldom varies.  Foundations do not have to actively 
police the boundaries of their version of political correctness.  They have spent decades 
cultivating networks of scholars who feel comfortable articulating and elaborating 
pluralist theories of society and politics.  The only action foundations need to take to 
perpetuate the system is to continue cultivating scholars and experts who already share 
their point of view.  It is not necessary to chastise or criticize dissidents.  It is much more 
efficient to ignore them.  The ultimate test of hegemonic power is whether an institution 
can exercise power without seeming to do so.  By that criterion, foundations are among 
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1
 It should be noted that Inboden’s response demonstrates precisely how hegemony 
works.  Foundation presidents do not have to respond to the evidence I found in their 
archives of a consistent pattern of creating a global network of elites.  Instead a professor 
of public policy, and a former member of George W. Bush’s National Security Council,  
can carry out that task for them.  I do not mean to imply that Prof. Inboden was "hired" 
by the foundations for this purpose.  Rather, I imagine that he has been sufficiently 
influenced by a century-long program of image-building by the foundations to take their 
public self-image at face value.   
2
 Again, we might note that the absence of interest by the mainstream press in the United 
States about this story demonstrates the hegemony thesis.  Most newspapers follow the 
lead of the New York Times, and its editors are connected through social ties to the same 
elite networks as the Ford Foundation. 
3
 Doyle was not the only American scholar to resign from the program in Indonesia 
because of concerns about politics.  Ralph Anspach, a graduate student at the time, also 
resigned from the program because he did not want "to be part of this American policy of 
empire... bringing in American science and attitudes and culture... winning over 
countries—doing this with a lot of cocktails and high pay" (Ransom 1970: 42). 
4
 According to Manitzas (1973a), “The transferability of North American wisdom and 
technique was an article of faith running through much of the Foundation’s program." 
She further argued that "development” did not adequately feed, house, educate, or clothe 
people and that “development” had, in fact, exacerbated extant inequalities and begun to 
polarize societies, eroding the “political middle," as had happened in Chile. 
